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Abstract 
Some digital business models may be so innovative that they overwhelm existing 
regulatory mechanisms, both legislation and historical jurisprudence, and require 
extension to or modification of antitrust law.  Regulatory policies that were developed 
in response to 19th or 20th century antitrust concerns dealt principally with economies of 
scale leading to monopoly power, and may not be well suited to the issues of network 
effects or third-party payer online business models like sponsored search.  From the 
perspective of information systems economics we investigate if such third party payer 
digital systems require intervention as profound as the Government’s innovative 
approach to the problems posed by AT&T in the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, 
establishing the first private regulated monopoly.  Google provides an example of a 
company whose innovative digital business model is difficult to fit into current 
regulatory frameworks, and may provide examples of the issues that might require an 
extension to regulatory policy.  
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Introduction 
Objectives of the Paper 
This paper addresses the regulatory prospects facing any truly successful firm in an age 
of Internet technology, “ winner take all”  economics [43], and integrated platform-based 
competition.  The major issue addressed in the paper how well suited American legal 
practice, especially commercial and antitrust statutes and jurisprudence, are for dealing 
with modern digital business strategies. 
American commercial and regulatory legal practice was largely formulated during an 
industrial era, when the dangers of monopoly market power were associated with 
manufacturing giants.  Of course, the courts have creatively constructed the present 
antitrust doctrine to keep it as relevant as possible, and much of what is applied to cases 
today is the result of the courts’ interpretations of the Sherman Act rather than the 
Sherman Act itself.  Still, the courts are always to some extent constrained by the 
original legislation that defines the issues before them and by the history of 
jurisprudence, which itself often lags behind industrial practices.  Manufacturers note 
that the courts are much better at regulating them than they are at regulating giant 
retailers like Wal-Mart and Home Depot; of course, at the time that the Sherman Act 
was drafted, antitrust was far more concerned with the very real prospect of giant 
manufacturing trusts than it was with the then-unimaginable problems caused by giant 
retailers.   
This leads us to ask how appropriate existing regulatory frameworks are to competition 
among businesses with modern, post-industrial digital business models.  Inevitably, 
attempting to apply existing law to these businesses will need to deal with issues never 
anticipated either when legislation was drafted or when it was interpreted over decades 
of jurisprudence.  Inevitably, there will be disputes, and this paper addresses where 
they will arise.   We also ask when commercial and regulatory legal practice might 
actually fail to address the new competitive environment and thus need to be explicitly 
altered and updated.  We believe that extensions to antitrust will be required, that to 
some extent extensions can be addressed through additional flexibility and 
reinterpretation by the courts, and that to some extent legislative change will be 
required.  We use the perspective of information economics to address limitations, and 
to guide extensions.  We believe that technology determines what it is possible for firms 
to do, and the interaction of economics and technology guides the behavior of profit 
maximizing firms.  When the behavior of these firms is not consistent with public policy 
objectives, technology, economics, and profit maximizing behavior are largely outside 
society’s control, but the laws and regulations that guide the firms are not.   
We believe that the implications of current technology are so far outside of what was 
anticipated when most of our regulatory frameworks were constructed that these 
frameworks may fail to provide socially desirable outcomes when firms rationally 
adopt newly available business models.  A lthough we are writing for an information 
systems readership, we have felt it necessary to provide a significant number of legal 
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citations.  First, these citations take the debate out of the domain of mere opinion, and 
provide the basis for our analyses.  Second, and more importantly, if our information 
systems colleagues are to extend our work, they should not need to reproduce our legal 
research, but rather can begin their own analyses with a firm understanding of the legal 
jurisprudence upon which the current legal debates are going to be based.  
To illustrate this last point, the need to clarify, extend, or modify current legal practice, 
we take an example from Google’s history, where the courts have been attempting to 
rule on a current business practice that was not anticipated when relevant legislation 
was drafted, and where the courts have specifically requested that Congress provide 
more explicit guidance.  We use this example merely to illustrate the need for additional 
regulatory clarity; we will not stress this example in the body of this paper.  The intent 
of the Lanham Act (also known informally as the Trademark Act) was clear: (1) to 
prevent consumer confusion by restricting the use of brands and trademarks to their 
legitimate owners and (2) to increase the quality of products offered to consumers by 
providing incentives for companies to invest in their brands.  The Trademark Act is 
very specific about the protections it affords a brand, providing that no company can 
use another company’s trademark for commercial purposes in a way that confuses or 
misguides consumers; the exact wording, about using a competitor’s trademark for 
commercial gain, is less clear today than was believed when the Act was originally 
drafted.i  In other words, it’s clear from the statute that a company cannot put a Coke 
label on a can of Pepsi or even on a machine that sells Pepsi and not Coke.  
Unfortunately, with today’s online business models, with sale of trademarks and 
optimization of search engine relative positioning, there are many opportunities to use 
trademarks in ways that were not anticipated and thus now much about the bill that is 
no longer clear.   
How does this act inform us in assessing whether or not a search engine operator’s sale 
of keywords is or should be legitimate?  By selling trademarks it does not own in a 
keyword auction search engines are certainly using the trademarks of other companies 
for their own commercial gain, although in a way not anticipated by the framers of the 
Trademark Act.  As certainly, by selling a company’s trademark to a competitor for use 
in the competitor’s marketing efforts, may in some sense be the equivalent of putting 
Coke logo’s on a Pepsi machine that it operates, but again it was acting in a way that 
was not anticipated by the drafters of the Trademark Act.  This may be like misdirecting 
Coke’s customers to a Pepsi machine, but in general properly labeling the machine 
when the customers actually arrive.  At present it is unclear if this is the legal equivalent 
of mislabeling the vending machine, or indeed if it should be.   
So does sale of registered trademarks as search terms violate the Trademark Act?  The 
courts initially decided it did not in the Rescuecom case [87], but in Google’s first major 
legal setback this was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Court 
claimed that this practice could not have been endorsed by the framers of the Act; as 
importantly, they requested more clear and more modern and relevant guidance from 
Congress.  Google has lost trademark cases in Europe [59] and, more recently, has won 
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cases as well [72].  The issue is further complicated by the fact that Rescuecom has 
subsequently dropped its suit against Google [52], so resolution of ambiguity will not 
come from the Rescuecom case. 
When we need a specific instance we focus on Google in this study, largely for the same 
reasons that the authors of previous cases focused on Capital One in the case study of 
screening mechanisms in banking as a test of the newly vulnerable markets hypothesis 
[32], on McKesson Drug in the case study of the strategic necessity hypothesis in drug 
distribution [31], or the case study of the London Stock Exchange after its automation 
made it the first major securities market to abandon its trading floor [33].  These were 
important early exemplars of emerging trends, trends with lessons beyond the 
individual company studied, and indeed beyond the industry in which these exemplars 
competed.  Google is the search engine with the largest market share, has been involved 
in more litigation, and is facing more discussion of regulation.  It is, indeed, the best 
example we could find for assessing the future of American regulation of digital 
businesses. 
Google has announced its intention to defend itself against any and all litigation.  In 
fact, Google’s 10-K filing for 2008 indicates that their general and administrative 
expenses increased from $1.279.3 billion in 2007 to $1.802.6 billion in 2008.  As they note, 
“ This increase was primarily related to an increase in professional services of $243.0 
million, the majority of which were related to legal costs ...”  [46].  For instance, rather 
than concede on the sensitive issue of trademark abuse, Google has announced that it 
intends to extend its policy (as described on its website) on allowing companies to bid 
for the right to use other companies’ trademarks in its AdSense and AdWords auctions 
[92].   It is clear that Google is prepared to challenge ambiguities and anachronisms in 
commercial jurisprudence, making this an ideal way to approach an understanding of 
the strengths and possible limitations of current regulatory practice.  It is equally clear 
that regulators and legislators need to respond with a clear understanding of the 
economics of digital businesses and the risks and benefits to consumers implicit in new 
digital strategies. 
Specific Issues Addressed in Our Research 
We address the following five areas, informed by legal doctrine, but from the 
perspective of information economics: 
1. Presence of M onopoly: When is a new digital business model an extension to 
previous products or services competing with them for share of an existing 
market, and when is it radical enough to represent a business in its own right, 
and not a substitute for other companies’ historical offerings?  
2. Presence of M onopoly Power:  When do you know that you have monopoly 
power and a monopoly ability to set prices?  
3. Abuse of M onopoly Power:  How can you tell when monopoly power has been 
abused, causing harm to consumers, competitors, or to the very process of 
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 6 
competition?  
4. Applicability and Efficacy of Existing Legal Remedies:  When can monopoly 
power be limited through the legal system?  Traditionally, monopoly power has 
been prosecuted only when it is obtained illegally, in order to reward 
entrepreneurial creativity; monopoly power obtained through innovation and 
excellence has generally been held to be legal.  In rare instances, monopoly 
power was considered to be a fundamental property of an industry, as it was 
with 19th and 20th century telephony, prior to easy interconnectivity among 
competing service providers; in that case the concept of a regulated natural 
monopoly was introduced.   
5. Need for Fundamental Regulatory Change:  Do third party payer digital 
business models, as exemplified by paid search, require intervention as profound 
as the Justice Department’s intervention against AT&T in The Kingsbury 
Commitment?  We believe that each of these questions is best addressed from the 
perspective of information economics, and indeed, information economics will 
be necessary to guide and inform the development of appropriate law. 
Throughout this paper we will use the term economics to mean micro-economics and 
the analysis of the decisions of consumers who are maximizing their welfare and firms 
that are maximizing their profits.  Consumers decide how much to work and at what 
jobs, and what to purchase and how much to purchase of the goods and services on 
offer.  Firms decide what to produce, how to produce it, and what quantities to offer, 
based on their assessment of the decisions of consumers and of other firms.   
Overview of Principal Areas of Legal Doctrine Used in Our Analyses 
The principal legal issues we use to support our information economic analyses are 
listed below.  This short introduction is not intended to detail the logic or to present 
either current statutes or jurisprudence and litigation history.  It is intended to guide the 
reader through what will follow and to allow the reader who is less familiar with 
antitrust or with legal reasoning to impose some structure on the paper as he or she 
reads through the text: 
• Relevant M arket Share — How would you know if you were dealing with a 
monopoly?  You start by determining what the relevant market is, and then 
examine the company’s share of that market.   For example, is Google just 
another advertising company or is it the dominant player in search?  Similarly, 
the Department of Justice (DoJ) needed to determine if Microsoft was just 
another software firm or if it was the dominant player in operating systems for 
Intel-based personal computers?  This is essential to determining if a company 
has monopoly power. 
• Electronic Distribution and the Essential Facilities Doctrine — Is search a form 
of advertising, or is it better viewed as a form of electronic distribution, with its 
own economics and business model, quite separate from advertising?   Is search 
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an essential facility, one that indeed not only can augment advertising but in a 
real sense can trump it by redirect customers away from one well-advertised 
brand and to competitors?  Does control over search confer enormous and 
perhaps irresistible market power and pricing power in the sale of keywords?  
Does this power even survive the presence of viable competitors, allowing the 
formation of “ parallel monopolies” , each with monopoly pricing power?  Does the 
seller of an essential facility have monopoly power even if the price is set 
through a market auction?  A lternatively, perhaps none of these questions is 
relevant.  Does essential facilities doctrine even apply, since historically it has 
been used to regulate transactions between competitors:  The doctrine may have 
been applicable in disputes between MCI and AT&T or between airlines and the 
reservations systems owned by competing airlines, but is it applicable in 
disputes between Google and its bidders, which are firms in very different 
industries?  This is essential to determining if a company has monopoly power 
even in the absence of monopoly market share.  It is also relevant to determining 
if a company has been behaving as a monopolist. 
• Bundling, Subsidies, and the Potential Stifling of Competition — Is the giving 
away of products, bundled (as Internet Explorer was with Windows) or stand-
alone (as gMail is w ith search) necessarily a form of predatory pricing, does it 
stifle competition, and is it always associated with a potentially predatory 
monopoly?  While giving products away without charge is not illegal, giving 
products away to develop a monopoly position to be exploited later is indeed 
illegal.  When foreign firms engage in this practice within the United States it is 
called dumping and it is indeed prosecuted.  While the tight interaction of 
products and services is beneficial to consumers, bundling, tying, and cross-
subsidies may harm future competition, even if no present competitor and no 
present consumer can demonstrate harm.  Antitrust law does indeed permit 
prosecution of actions that harm the competitive process, even if no consumers 
and no firms have yet been directly harmed.ii  This is useful when determining if 
a company has been behaving as a monopolist or is positioning itself to behave 
as a monopolist in the future, or both. 
• Separation of Payer and User in a Platform that Constitutes an Essential 
Facility — Third party payer business models did not originate with the Internet, 
but they may so thoroughly decouple pricing from the discipline of the market, 
and they may now become so prevalent among Internet firms, as to require a 
change in regulatory philosophy.  Google’s business model is only the latest 
example of a third party payer platform; earlier examples included Sabre and 
Apollo as computerized travel agent reservation systems.  In the third-party 
payer model, the provider of the platform (party one) provides an essential 
service to the user community (party two) without charge, while charging a third 
party for participation (party three), in this instance charging searchers nothing 
to search while charging the third party fees in order to be present and thus in 
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order to be found.  Are the economics and channel power implications of this 
model such that these businesses must inevitably create severe competitive risks 
in the absence of regulatory oversight?  Before their regulation the largest 
reservations systems, Sabre and Apollo, enjoyed enormous freedom in setting 
their fees because they were able to charge airlines rather than travel agencies.  
Google today likewise enjoys enormous latitude in setting its prices for 
keywords, in large measure because searchers never pay or even see those prices.  
Because users search with Google, companies must participate in Google search 
and they must pay enough to participate.  Does this structure inherently harm 
the competitive process?  Most importantly, does this new business model now 
require an explicit extension to the Sherman (Antitrust) Act, much as AT&T’s 
natural monopoly in telecommunications in the early part of the 20th century did? 
The paper advances the following legal arguments: 
• Google may enjoy monopoly power in search, which is the relevant market for 
consideration, and not advertising. 
• Search may be a form of electronic distribution, like travel agent reservations 
systems, and search may be an essential facility, one to which companies must 
have access if their business requires that they can be found by consumers.   
• Search engines’ third party payer business model may free their keyword 
auctions from the effective discipline of the market; that is, prices in the auction 
may be limited by the value of the contact to the firm bidding for auction terms, 
not by the value of search to the consumer if the consumer is not paying.  
Owners of such essential facilities may enjoy monopoly pricing power in the 
presence of parallel monopolies, rather than pure monopolies, because if some 
consumers only use Google then it is essential to be present in Google, even if 
Yahoo were available at a lower price.   
• And if the above are true, and if Google uses even a small portion of its 
monopoly profits to provide incentives to consumers to remain with Google, 
then this business model will remain stable even if prices charged to corporations 
are extraordinarily high, further increasing consumers’ reliance upon Google.  
Again, if consumers are induced to stay, and consumers are not the ones paying 
for search, there is no discipline imposed upon the price of search by the market. 
• Finally, if the above are true, and if Google uses a significant portion of its 
monopoly profits to underwrite other ventures, it may be able to engage in 
subsidized preemptive line extensions, increasing consumer choice initially but 
restricting future competition. 
The rest of the paper provides some context on search engine providers, and on Google 
specifically, and then examines the legal arguments that would need to be used to 
assess each of the points above.   
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Essential Disclaimers 
It is essential to note the following disclaimers while reading this paper. 
• We are not describing why Google should face antitrust litigation 
• We are not describing why Google should lose antitrust litigation 
• We are not describing or seeking to quantify the precise economic damages that 
may be caused by Google  
• We are describing what the central issues in any litigation may entail, within the 
context of current antitrust jurisprudence, if indeed such litigation occurs, to 
highlight the areas where regulatory change may be necessary. 
Most importantly, we are describing specific areas in which current jurisprudence may 
prove inadequate, leading to groundbreaking disputes over appropriate extensions. 
Indeed, Google also believes that the issues raised here are those that they will face in 
court, if indeed, this ever goes to court.  Like any firm that is responsible to interests of 
their investors, they are preemptively attempting to put the best possible spin on them, 
through press releases (e.g., [50]) and meetings with major newspapers (e.g., Burns, 
[13]). Not surprisingly, they also have an extensive lobbying budget [55].  The analysis 
presented here can help provide an understanding of why antitrust litigation will or 
will not be brought against Google, and can help provide an understanding of the 
arguments that will unfold and the decisions that will need to be made if such antitrust 
proceedings commence.   
Many of these issues are still in flux, like the explicit meanings of and limits to 
applicability of bundling and tying or essential facilities doctrine, with the courts 
continuing to redefine, clarify, and alter interpretations.  Litigation is likely not only to 
be shaped by decades of legal history on the issues mentioned in our review of specific 
issues above, but also is likely to shape antitrust regulation and jurisprudence for next 
several decades as well.  For that reason the views of those of us who study information 
economics, business strategy, and modern competition may suddenly and at least 
briefly now be as relevant as the views of antitrust lawyers in the shaping of America’s 
antitrust policies. 
When the issue of economics is addressed by litigators, it is usually in the context of 
quantifying damages, which is usually based on some form of accounting, cost 
accounting, or but-for analysis.  (But-for analysis”  is a means of assessing how the world 
would have been, but-for a specific action, in order to assess whether or not harm has 
occurred and the extent of any resulting harm.  In general, concrete econometrics or 
simulation modeling is required, and fanciful analyses are generally not permitted, such 
as for “ For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of a 
horse the rider was lost … ,”   which try to blame the blacksmith for the fall of a kingdom.)  
Rather, the discussion of economics here is intended to highlight that economics drives 
business strategy, which is constrained or channeled by law, to achieve broad social 
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goals.  As technology changes economics, changing the range of profitable alternatives 
available to business, the law may need to be changed as well.  A t no point in this paper 
do we attempt either to determine the presence of harm or to provide estimates of 
damages that might result should harm be determined to have been caused. 
Structure of The Paper 
The structure of this paper is as follows:   
• We first explain our interest in Google as the most successful example of a third 
party payer digital business, and presents a quick review of the company and its 
business model.   
• We next explain the concept of relevant market share, essential to the DoJ’s case 
against Microsoft, and likely to be central to any DoJ action involving Google.   
• We examine electronic distribution in the context of the essential facilities 
doctrine and asks if the regulation of essential facilities needs to be rethought or 
extended in order to deal explicitly with electronic distribution channels.   
• We examine whether there is any evidence that Google has monopoly power or 
is exploiting monopoly power: (1) What are Google’s current business practices, 
can it set its own prices for search terms, and does it bias search in a way that 
damages consumers?  (2) Does it have extraordinary market power?  (3) Does its 
ability to provide for cross-subsidies for other lines of business strengthen the 
argument for monopoly power? (4) Do these cross subsidies help or harm 
competition by increasing or decreasing consumer choice? (5) Do these cross 
subsidies violate prohibitions bundling and tying or any other existing legal 
doctrines?  
• We consider whether or not there is sufficient possibility of consumer harm to 
justify the Department of Justice’s considering bringing an antitrust case against 
Google.  We examine both current harm, due to consumer confusion, inferior 
purchases, or higher prices, and future harm, due to harm to the competitive 
process and reduction in future choice, reduction in future innovation, or higher 
prices in the future.  It concludes by considering if it appears that these cross 
subsidies harm competition and that the monopoly power that created them was 
obtained legally, is it necessary to provide new regulatory guidance or will the 
existing legal framework prove adequate to provide judicial relief? 
• Finally, we present our conclusions regarding the five issues raised in the review 
of specific issues above, examines limitations of this work and directions for 
future research. 
This paper does not explicitly consider the possibility of private antitrust lawsuits, 
brought either by competitors or by customers.  We had considered customer lawsuits 
unlikely because of the oft-stated fear of retaliation by Google or by costs associated 
with such litigation, until we recently became aware of Tradecomet.com v. Google [75].  
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The requirements for a private suit would be different with respect to standing and to a 
degree would be more difficult to satisfy,iii  but the essential logic needed to support the 
litigation would be similar to that which we expect would be pursued by the 
Department of Justice, and the problems interpreting current law and legal practice 
likewise would be similar. 
An Overview of Google and its Business M odel 
Google is certainly an Internet success story, with 60% or more of the US market for 
Internet search; recent estimates range from a low of 67% to a high of 77% [22], [45], 
[68], and do not appear to be dropping significantly since the launch of Microsoft’s 
Bing.  The company does not break out profit margins by lines of business, but w ith an 
operating margin in excess of 35% for the company as a whole [93], and with virtually 
all profits coming from search, profit margins from search are extraordinarily high.  
Likewise, profits from search have funded its expansion into a range of semi-related 
and unrelated activities.  Google is not only one of the most profitable companies on the 
net, but it is one of the most admired companies in America, having done a marvelous 
job of managing its public image.  It has found a business model that allows it to 
provide a product to one set of customers (users performing search) without charge, 
while having another set of customers to pay very high prices (companies desiring to be 
found) to subsidize the services offered to the searchers, adding to the firm’s popularity. 
Google’s model is working:  Simple financials provide one indication.  With gross 
profits of $13.17 billion on sales of $23.65 billion, with profit margins of 27.57% and 
return on equity of 20.30%, and with a cash horde of $24.48 billion, Google truly is the 
successful giant among search engines.  The equivalent figures for Yahoo, Google’s 
closest competitor in search, are gross profits of $4.19 billion on sales of  $6.46 billion, 
profit margins of 9.26% and a return on equity of 5.04%, and cash on hand of $3.29 
billion [93]. 
Google has a wide range of other business activities, not all related to search, which can 
be viewed on its website (www.google.com/ options/ ). 
• Twenty three of these are related to search beyond its traditional search engine, 
including commercial (Checkout), scholarly (Scholar), image-focused (Images) 
and map-based (Maps, Earth) and special purpose (finance, patent). Google now 
offers its own browser under this category as well (Chrome). 
• Another fourteen are aimed at communications and sharing.  These are largely 
free to their users. 
• Three more are aimed at mobile users. 
Some evidence of Google’s popularity can be gathered from the Fortune lists of the 
World’s 50 Most Admired Companies and the Fortune lists of the 100 Best Companies 
to Work for in America and the Forbes list of Most Admired companies in America.  
While not previously on the list of most admired companies, in 2009 Google earned 
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fourth spot on Fortune’s list of most admired companies.  Similarly, while not 
previously on the list of best companies to work for, Google entered the list at number 1 
in 2007, in part based on extraordinary benefits and, of course, in part based on 
extraordinary non-salary compensation, and in 2008 and 2009 continued to enjoy the 
fourth spot.  
Google’s users are extraordinarily loyal and vocal [70]: 
• “ Government touches google = we revolt… this is sacred ground people!”  
• “ What if GOOGLE broke up the GOVERNMENT, would be a more interesting story”  
• “ Don’t you dare touch Google? It’s personal.”  
• “ I don’t think that GOOGLE should be worried about the GOVERNMENT … now vice 
versa…”  
• “ They can take my Google when they pry the keyboard from my cold, dead hands.”  
Clearly, by any measure, this is a popular company, and Google believes that this may 
help deter or soften antitrust action.   
Whether despite or because of its popularity, Google is now attracting unwanted at-
tention from a range of sources.  Some authors are beginning to question the stability of 
a business based on attracting online ad revenues (e.g., [53]), and some even consider 
the possibility that online community content may eventually replace much of Google’s 
online advertising [24], [25], [27], [39].  Moreover, the general tone of press coverage 
now regularly addresses the risks facing the company from antitrust litigation (e.g., 
[18], [21], [57], [65], [70]), and the anger of corporate participants in Google’s auctions 
(e.g., [18], [64], [69]), and even concerns over Google’s appropriating the content of 
others without compensation [64]. 
Relevant M arket Share 
The Concept of Relevant M arket  
Relevant market share is assessed by first determining what the market for a product or 
service product is, and then by determining what percentage of that market that 
product or service has captured.  This sounds unambiguous, but determining the set of 
alternatives, direct competitor and substitute products, can be quite complex.  One local 
New York or Philadelphia national network affiliate is probably clearly substitutable for 
another as venues for advertising.  However, the substitutability of The New York Times, 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Wall Street Journal, of Fortune Magazine, Time Magazine, 
and The Economist, or of the History Channel, The Golf Channel, and The Food Channel 
is less clear; indeed, these latter alternatives to a television network affiliate probably 
need to be arrayed in a two dimensional space, with one axis indicating the target 
audience and another axis indicating the degree of substitutability. 
The experience of Microsoft indicates the importance of determination of the relevant 
market and of relevant market share.  Microsoft represents only a small portion of the 
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 13 
global economy.  It is a larger portion of the technology sector, a larger portion still of 
computing hardware and software, and an even larger portion of the market for all 
software.  Most importantly, it is a huge portion of the Intel operating system market.  
During trial, Microsoft tried to argue it was about 3% of the software market; opposing 
them, the DoJ and David Boies argued that it was closer to 90% of the relevant market, 
the market at the time for operating systems for Intel-based machines. 
The concept of relevant market share was so critical in Microsoft antitrust litigation that 
it is nearly certain to be relevant here as well in assessing how important Google search 
is to firms’ access to their customersiv.  As Schmalensee notes [67], following Areeda and 
Turner [1] “ judgements [sic] about the presence or absence of market power often turn on the 
definition of the ‘relevant market,’ especially in U.S. antitrust cases.”   While Schmalensee 
defines this in terms of collusion, more intuitive definitions are possible.  Attorney 
David Boies, when arguing The Department of Justice’s position in Microsoft antitrust 
litigation, preferred to argue in terms of direct substitutes, consistent with earlier 
Supreme Court decisions including Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 
which defined relevant market as the choice available to consumers ([40] at 481-82).  
This view of relevant markets was critical in the Government’s antitrust case against 
Microsoft in which Microsoft’s market share in the relevant market was found to exceed 
95% ([78] at 74).   
 
While Microsoft argued that the relevant market was the market for all software, the 
DoJ argued that the relevant market was the market for all operating systems software 
for Intel platform computers.  While Microsoft’s share of the global software market 
may be quite small, its share of personal computer software is larger, and its share of 
operating systems sales for machines based on the Intel platform was at the time nearly 
100%.  Indeed, based on these statistics, Microsoft and its witnesses were very reluctant 
to see any definition of relevant markets accepted during the trial; in his first 65 pages 
of testimony Professor Schmalensee refused to accept the utility or importance of the 
concept in this trial, and argued that virtually any piece of software might ultimately 
emerge as a viable competitor for Microsoft’s OS [76] . We can expect similar resistance 
from Google to the definition of online search as the relevant market for online search, 
and a similar need for clarification of what constitutes advertising and what does not in 
an era of digital acquisition of information before shopping.    
The Lessons of Share of Relevant M arket from The M icrosoft Trial  
Just as Microsoft represents only a small portion of the global economy, Google is a 
small portion of the global economy.  It is, of course, a larger portion of the Internet 
economy, and it is a huge portion of the market for Internet search.  Google is now 
trying to argue it is less than 3% of the advertising market [50]; however, if it were 
shown that search is not a form of advertising, that advertising is not substitutable for 
participation in search, and indeed that keyword auctions can trump or devalue 
traditional advertising, then the relevant market will not be seen as all of advertising.   
Consequently, if Google is subject to antitrust action, the DoJ will almost certainly have 
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to argue that the relevant market is online search, and that Google possesses between 
60% and 70% of this relevant market.  Google accepts the importance of this distinction, 
and while it acknowledges that it currently captures 72% of the revenue for search 
advertising, it represents only 30% of online advertising and less than 3% of all 
advertising revenues.  This information is taken with permission from Google’s 
presentations at The Wharton School on 1 March 2010.  
Sponsored search exemplifies the complexity of identifying relevant markets when 
assessing new products and services, especially when these new offerings can be 
framed in terms of more traditional predecessors.  We are not suggesting that Google 
calls its business a form of advertising to deceive either consumers or the courts.  
Initially, its customers, companies that could be induced to bid for keywords, 
understood advertising and had budgets for advertising; there could not have been a 
better way to position the business for initial adoption by corporate bidders.   
Is Search Just Advertising? 
Google calls its profitable businesses Adwords and Adsense.  Why aren’t these just forms 
of advertising, and why isn’t relevant market just advertising in all its forms and 
utilizing all available media? 
But we know what advertising is.  Advertising presents material to you while you are 
doing something else, such as presenting an ad on the lower half of the printed while 
you are reading the Times, making you navigate through a screen you encounter before 
you enter Forbes’s online website, or interrupting with a TV a commercial you view 
while watching the Super Bowl.  Advertising creates a desire to buy now, or a sense of 
trust in a brand that leads to buying later [24], [25].  The best advertising leaves you 
with a clear and memorable image of the firm that sponsored it, like “We love to fly and it 
shows (American Airlines),”or “Smart.  Very Smart! (Holiday Inn Express)” or “Just do it! 
(Nike)”. 
These ads are much less useful if the customers search for a product after seeing the 
companies’ ad, only to be redirected and to end up at a competitor’s website.  We 
believe that advertising is not a substitute for search, anymore than a personal 
computer owner can substitute Photoshop or SAP in place of Vista or Windows.  Search 
is thus different from advertising [24], and not an alternative for advertising, but a 
means of rendering advertising less important, perhaps even irrelevant [25].  Paid 
search allows a company to take temporary possession of a competitor’s brand, so that if a 
user searches on Marriott Marquis or InterContinental London they can send the user to 
a bidder for keywords like “ Marriott” , “ Marquis” , or “ InterContinental” , not 
necessarily the owner of the brand.  The distinction between search and advertising in 
the definition of the relevant market may be crucial to any future antitrust litigation 
against Google.  If search is a form of electronic distribution, and if electronic 
distribution can provide monopoly power even with market share below one third of 
the market, then Google may be shown to have monopoly power, just as travel agent 
CRSs were ruled by the Civil Aviation Board to have monopoly power in 1984 and as 
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confirmed by the courts in 1985 [62]. Specifically, the court stated, “ Though no airline 
has a monopoly market share, that is not required by section 411”  ([77] at 1114.)   
The definition of Google’s product — whether or not it is a form of advertising — 
remains contested, and resolving this will again be crucial to the decision in any future 
antitrust trial of search engine providers.  This will continue to be debated, since 
redirection, and even misdirection, as alternative forms of customer acquisition are 
simply too powerful for the courts to ignore.  The history of acquisition through 
misdirection certainly predates the age of electronic marketing [10].  Needless to say, 
the British courts did not view this example, which involved using false lighthouses as 
signals to redirect ships onto reefs where they could be plundered, as advertising, or as 
any other legitimate form of business. 
Google, of course, sees things differently, and argues that placing an ad for a sponsored 
product above the product for which the consumer is searching is little different from 
placing a store branded mouthwash next to Listerine, in a bottle size, shape, and color 
as much like Listerine’s as possible.  In Rescuecom, Google argued that “ use of the 
Rescuecom trademark is no different from that of a retail vendor who uses “ product 
placement”  to allow one vender to benefit from a competitors' name recognition [49].  
An example of product placement occurs when a store-brand generic product is placed 
next to a trademarked product to induce a customer who specifically sought out the 
trademarked product to consider the typically less expensive, generic brand as an 
alternative.”    Little in the history of advertising or of more traditional physical product 
placement prepares the courts to address this issue. 
Direction, M isdirection, and Redirection Explained 
What does it mean to say the searcher “ gets sent somewhere else” ?  Definitions of 
several terms may help (numbers in the text correspond to the numbered arrows in 
figure 1, which follows): 
• Organic Search (1) — The results of a search returned because Google’s 
algorithms suggest that these are the most relevant item for the user, based on 
the terms in his or her search.   
• Sponsored Search (2) — The result of a search returned because a sponsor bid 
enough for key words that appeared in the user’s search sequence.  These terms 
may be generic (e.g., London, hotel), obviously brand names (e.g., Marriott), or 
more ambiguous (e.g., Holiday, Inn).  The term may appear because the sponsor 
was the highest bidder, or, increasingly, because the sponsor bid enough, and 
Google determined that this is the company that the user would have wanted to 
see, even in the absence of bidding.   It may not always be obvious to the user 
that these are sponsored search results. 
• M ap Ads (3) — These are the URLs that appear next to a map returned in 
response to the user’s search. 
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• Ads (4) — These are terms that appear off to the right of the organic and 
sponsored search results.  Most users are easily able to identify these as ads.  Like 
sponsored search, these results appear because companies purchased keywords, 
and these keywords were used in a user’s search string, triggering the 
appearance of the ad. 
• Scam Ads (Not shown) — This term is poorly defined, but the concept has some 
industry participants very concerned [69].  Basically, a scam ad (or scads) appears 
to be a URL sponsored by the trademark owner, but is actually the sponsored 
URL for a different company, either a competitor, or a third party reseller that 
sells many competing brands and may or may not actually represent the owner 
of the trademark.  These can appear among sponsored search results, map ads, or 
ads. 
 
Figure 1.—The results of a search for Marriott Marquis New York 
As a consequence of sponsored search, map ads, and outright deceptive scam ads, even 
if the user is searching for a specific company or a specific product, using the relevant 
brand name as a keyword, he or she may end up clicking on someone else’s URL unless 
the firm that owns the brand has chosen pay and to participate in Google’s keyword 
auction. 
Both Google and its supporters argue that the presence of sponsored search and ads 
greatly increases consumer choice by suggesting items consumers may not have known 
existed, thus making consumers aware of numerous additional alternatives; increasing 
consumer choice, it is argued, improves the consumer shopping experience.  This 
argument has some value, but it is both simplistic and, itself, misleading.  Many firms 
offer suggestion facilities.  Amazon, for example, has a recommender system that is fair 
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and honest, based on collaborative filtering, and requires no expensive bidding; 
Amazon’s system also is clear and not misleading, and its suggestions are obviously 
labeled as recommendations, not as alternatives that appear above the item that the 
customer requested.  It is clear by comparison with Amazon that this model would be 
far less profitable for Google, but it would be far less expensive for corporations and for 
consumers who ultimately pay the increased costs of Google search that are passed 
through as higher consumer prices.  Obviously, neither Google nor any other search 
engine has any incentive to provide a free recommender service, but it is useful to note 
that recommender services and paid search are not equivalent. 
Electronic Distribution and Essential Facilities 
Introduction to the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The essential facilities doctrine provides that a monopolist or a near monopolist that 
controls a facility that cannot be duplicated by competitors must provide access to the 
facility if it is feasible to do so ([58] at 1132). “ Specifically, four elements must be 
satisfied to establish liability under the essential facilities: (1) control of the essential 
facility by the monopolist; (2) competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; (3) unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and (4) feasibility of providing the facility [58].  The essential facil ities 
doctrine has evolved through legal history and jurisprudence and it is a matter of 
common law rather than the result of specific legislation.  For a more detailed treatment 
see [37].  The Supreme Court has never recognized the essential facilities doctrine 
although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest that it 
is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence.  For example, in Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Supreme Court stated, “ [w]e have never 
recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it 
here”  [89].  This was also addressed in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc.  [60].  We will return to this in our exploration of the uncertain 
future of the essential facilities doctrine, below. 
Overview of Electronic Distribution as An Essential Facility 
If search is not a form of advertising, what is it?  We believe that Google’s business 
model is a form of electronic distribution, or a form of paying for customer access, and 
we believe that this form of electronic distribution and customer access is an essential 
facility.  Indeed, the argument we will present in our review of prior experience with 
electronic distribution suggest that this business model is largely analogous to that of 
the travel agent reservations systems in the 1980s. 
• When United A irlines wanted to take over Denver as its new domestic 
southwestern hub it redirected passengers away from Frontier and towards its 
own flights, using its travel agent reservations system, Apollo. 
• When American Airlines wanted to take over Dallas /  Fort Worth as its new 
domestic southwestern hub it redirected passengers away from Braniff and 
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towards its own flights, using its travel agent reservations system, Sabre. 
• Both Frontier and Braniff filed for bankruptcy, United captured its Denver hub 
and American acquired Dallas Fort Worth.  The power of these reservations 
systems was also then clear to other airlines, allowing Sabre and Apollo 
enormous freedom in pricing their CRS services. 
Prior Experience with Electronic Distribution as an Essential Facility 
Travel agents, Orbitz, and travel agent distribution systems like Amadeus and Galileo 
(formerly Sabre and Apollo) do not advertise airlines, they book flights.  Similarly, it’s 
difficult to argue that search engines strengthen any brand when they sell trademarks 
like Holiday Inn or Dove.  Rather, search engines direct customers, selling access, and 
acting more like a distribution service.  Brands are created and strengthened through 
product innovation, quality of service, and advertising.  Quite orthogonal to that, 
brands may now acquire distribution and customers through distribution services 
available to any bidder.  An ad in The New York Times may strengthen a brand, but even 
this does not help the trademark holder much, if search directs a searcher to a 
competing brand. 
Monopoly power in electronic distribution channels is often difficult to assess since the 
relationship between market share and market power may be deceptive, and even 
counter-intuitive.  Two historical examples that were subjects of much earlier research 
provide the best way to begin the analysis, because their economic implications are now 
very clear [23], [26], [29]. 
In the early 1980s American Airlines’ Sabre and United A irlines’ Apollo computerized 
reservations systems (CRSs) already dominated the market for travel agency 
reservations systems, with 43% and 27% market share respectively [36].  At the time 
80% of air travel bookings were made through travel agencies.  Thus, while neither 
Sabre nor Apollo accounted for a majority of any airline’s bookings, even the smaller of 
the two controlled access to approximately 20% of every airline’s potential customers 
and therefore approximately 20% of every airline’s sales.  
The historical record makes it clear that the CRSs had market power at the time.  When 
Apollo dropped Frontier from its reservations systems, Frontier was forced to file for 
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11; it reemerged, regained listings in Apollo, and 
continues to fly.  When Sabre, which was larger than Apollo, dropped Braniff, Braniff 
also filed for bankruptcy and no longer operates.  Clearly, Sabre and Apollo enjoyed 
considerable market power and clearly this power became evident to all airlines even if 
it was not immediately perceived by passengers or even by agencies.  Ultimately, both 
American and United were earning more from booking flights on other airlines than 
from their own operations, and at one point American was earning more from booking 
passengers on Delta’s flights than Delta was earning by operating them. 
Neither Sabre nor Apollo had a monopoly of the market for reservations services, but 
together each had a parallel monopoly on the share of the market that they served 
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 19 
through their agency customers.  This should be clear from figure 2 below.  Moreover, 
this arrangement subsequently became stable in ways that are not apparent from the 
diagram.  Both Sabre and Apollo paid travel agents to use their system, ensuring the 
continuation of their market share, and ensuring the continuation of their ability to 
charge competitors for participation in their systems.  These were not bribes, but were 
termed overrides in the industry. 
At approximately the same time Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), signed Provident as 
a customer bank for its MAC network, acquired Cash Stream, and consolidated the 
position of MAC as the sole ATM service provider for the Philadelphia region.  
Interestingly, even with 100% of the market for inter-bank ATM switching services, 
PNB lacked monopoly power, was unable to charge excessive fees to its member banks, 
and never represented a competitive threat to the other banks in Philadelphia.  This can 
be seen from figure 3.  The analysis for figures 2 and 3 is largely derived from our 
earlier work [22].  These figures first appeared in the Financial Times in 2006 and were 
reused in TechCrunch [26], [30]. 
 
Figure 2.—Geometry of Airlines, Travel Agents, and CRSs  in the 1980s. 
 
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 20 
Figure 3.—Geometry of Banks, ATMs, and the MAC ATM driver in the 1980s. 
From these pictures we see that the geometries of the two networks — CRS services and 
ATM services — are quite different.  The CRSs are positioned between the airlines and 
their passengers.  If one CRS drops an airline then all agencies that use the CRS and all 
of that agency’s customers are denied access to one (and only one) airline.  The agency 
may not care, and the customers may not even know.  Moreover, bypass of the CRS at 
the time, before the presence of search engines and online booking, meant that the lost 
business was likely to be impossible to recapture as long as participation in the CRS was 
denied.  Despite the high fees, no airline voluntarily removed itself from any CRS [36]. 
In contrast, each bank is positioned between its customers and the ATM network 
service provider MAC.  If a bank is denied access to the network, at least its own cards 
will work on its own machines.  Moreover, each bank used an identical interface in its 
communications with MAC.  Therefore the banks were able to forge an alliance — if 
PNB attempted to compete unfairly against any one of them, they would simply 
implement bilateral sw itching among themselves and cut MAC out entirely.   
Again, even with 100% market share, there were no complaints of abuse lodged against 
MAC by member banks [29].  In contrast, there were significant complaints lodged 
against the operators of the CRSs and, ultimately, rule changes from the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (whose responsibility was later transferred to the Department of 
Transportation after the CAB was eliminated in 1984), severely limited the power of the 
CRS operators.  These rule changes were subsequently confirmed by the 7th Circuit 
[77].  The reasoning of the decision explicitly acknowledges the CRSs as essential 
facilities [36]. 
As shown in figure 4, the geometry of the diagram looks strikingly similar to that of the 
airline reservations systems, with portals (AOL, etc.) in the position of travel agents, 
search engines in the position of CRSs, and sellers in the position that corresponds to 
airlines.  The principal difference, which turns out to be largely irrelevant to our 
argument, is that some users do go to Google.com or Yahoo.com to enter their search 
rather than use their home page search box when searching.  Still, most users have a 
default search engine and most do not switch search engines.     
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 21 
 
Figure 4.—Geometry of Airlines, Search Engines, and General Portals. 
Perhaps the greatest mistake an airline could have made when dealing with Apollo and 
Sabre was thinking that they had a choice of whether or not to participate; they had to 
participate, and they had to pay whatever prices Sabre and Apollo demanded.  And 
despite recommendations to consider your strategy carefully (see, for example, “ What’s 
Your Google Strategy?”  [47]) manufacturers, retailers, and service providers who need 
to be found by their customers do not need and indeed cannot have a strategy for 
dealing with Google in the sense described by the article’s authors; those that wish to 
survive will indeed continue to participate in Google and Yahoo’s keyword auctions. 
Google’s market share for sponsored search and for search generally is larger than the 
share Sabre or Apollo enjoyed.  The conditions are right for Google to enjoy enormous 
market power over service providers, who feel they must bid for positions in Google’s 
sponsored search keyword auctions. 
Offsetting the fact that Google’s market share advantage in search is greater than that 
which Sabre and Apollo once enjoyed is the fact that alternative routes into hotel 
reservations systems exist.  Customers can call the hotel or the chain’s reservations 
systems, or can use the hotel’s website, the chain’s website, or other third party 
websites. 
The Uncertain Future of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. 
We are not sure that the essential facilities doctrine, as it is evolving, will even be seen 
to be relevant by the time a trial might occur. The Supreme Court has never recognized 
the essential facilities doctrine, although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court 
decisions seem to suggest that it is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence, as 
discussed above.  
We do believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine will prove useful and valid.  
Redirection and misdirection give search engine providers enormous power, as travel 
agent reservations systems did before them.  The decoupling of use by searchers from 
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payment by companies that wish to be found effectively removes this essential facility 
from the discipline of market pricing, as it likewise did for reservations systems 
vendors.  Both regulators and the courts felt that reservations systems required 
regulation, and we believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine will provide 
the rationale for recoupling search engine vendors to the discipline of the markets.  
As it is currently understood, there are four elements that must be satisfied in order to 
establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine: 
1. Monopoly control of the essential facility, with what is currently understood as 
monopoly market share for the industry in question. 
2. Competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility. 
3. Unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a competitor. 
4. Feasibility of providing the facility.   
(See e.g., [58] at 1132 .) 
A lthough the essential facilities framework is applied in analyzing “ refusals to deal”  
between competitors, the following analysis shows how the current essential facilities 
doctrine might be applied to Google and to illustrate the shortcomings of essential 
facilities doctrine with respect to electronic distribution networks and paid search as the 
doctrine is currently understood: 
1. There is no doubt that Google controls its search engine and certainly “ guides”  
advertisers and competitors of trademarked brands in selecting those keywords.    
2. As described above, what prevents companies that object to paying for Google 
search is in part a function of the third party payer model, and in part a function 
of the nature of search itself.  No user wants a search engine from Marriott, and 
another from Hyatt, and another from Delta airlines, any more than a travel 
agent wanted a CRS from each airline that had a grievance with Sabre or Apollo; 
competition will only come from an alternative generic search engine with the 
full capabilities of Google.  And no user has a strong incentive to leave Google as 
long as Google is “ cheaper than free,”  any more than an agency had a reason to 
leave Sabre and Apollo when they were receiving large payments in the form of 
negative rents (again, called overrides in the industry) for using Sabre and 
Apollo.  
3. Since Google does not deny access to search to any firm that is willing to pay the 
demanded price for keywords it may appear that the essential facilities doctrine 
does not apply.  It is important to note that the same situation was present in the 
case of MCI Commc’n Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. cited above [58].  ATT did 
not deny MCI access to the wire into its customers’ home, access to the local 
loop, frequently also called “ access to the last mile” , it merely demanded 
payment that MCI considered extortionist.  The courts sided with MCI.   
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4. In the case of MCI Commc’n Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. the courts decided 
that AT&T could provide local loop access at lower rates than it was demanding 
[58].  The question remains whether Google would be required to provide its 
search service and keyword auctions at lower prices to companies that 
participate in its keyword auctions.   
We examine this fourth point, the pricing of an essential facility and the possibility that 
Google could offer lower prices, in the examination of the possibility of predatory pric-
ing, immediately following.  Most importantly, essential facilities arguments were his-
torically offered only when contesting firms where in the same industry.  Both AT&T 
and MCI were telecommunications companies, and American and Braniff were both 
airlines.  The use we are proposing for essential facilities adheres to the four points 
generally required, but remains novel since Google and the bidders for key words are 
not competitors.  The courts could indeed decide that Google has no obligation to pro-
vide search terms (that is, access to the facility of search) at lower prices.  We explore 
this, and the possible need for novel antitrust jurisprudence below, when we ask “ Is 
New Legal Doctrine Required to Permit Action?”  and  “ Is Additional Regulation Actu-
ally Needed?” . This has recently become more ambiguous, since the preliminary probe 
launched by the European Commission “ into its dominant position in online browsing 
and digital advertising following allegations that it demotes competing websites”  in 
search results l istings; in other words, that it denies competitors access to an essential 
facility [21]. 
Again, we are aware that we are going beyond traditional and generally accepted use of 
essential facilities doctrine.  For instance, Areeda & Turner caution that the doctrine 
should “ at most”  extend to “ facilities that are a natural monopoly, facilities whose 
duplication is forbidden by law, and perhaps those that are publicly subsidized and 
thus could not practicably be built privately”  ([5], ¶ 736.2b at 680-81).  While Google is 
not a natural monopoly and its market share is less than the near-100% of local loop 
access that AT&T controlled, it is significantly higher than the share that Sabre or 
Apollo enjoyed.  And again, we will argue in below that the parallel monopoly 
construct present in electronic distribution and the decoupling of search term prices 
from the discipline of the market, may require extensions to regulatory structures, much 
as the introduction of the now accepted concept of natural monopoly did when it was 
required to deal with the emergence of AT&T.  Once again, the courts could indeed 
decide that a parallel monopoly is no monopoly at all, that third party payer models are 
irrelevant, and that if present search providers’ prices are too high any or all bidders 
could abandon them. 
Google should, and will, argue that paid search does not constitute an essential facil ity; 
users can find anything they want through organic search, or by calling an organization 
after finding it in the yellow pages.  A irlines argued similarly that a traveler could make 
a hotel or airline reservation by bypassing their travel agencies and calling the 
company’s toll-free phone number, or in the case of hotels, by calling individual 
properties directly.  Most did not.  While the courts will be the final arbiters of any 
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change in antitrust policy to accommodate search and third party payer models, we feel 
that information economists are ideally suited to surface the critical new economic 
issues, and to provide guidance in this unfamiliar territory. 
The Possibility of Predatory Pricing and The Possible 
Anti-Competitive Uses of Any Resulting Profits 
Google’s Current Business Practices 
Google has argued that its business practices are legitimate for three reasons: 
1. because the best seller is generally ranked highest among sponsored search 
results 
2. because by definition sellers do not have to pay “ too much”  for the use of their 
own brands as search terms, because if they did they would refuse to pay and 
resort to other forms of advertising; their participation indicates that prices are 
fair and competitive 
3. because Google does not actually set prices for keywords, which are set by the 
market in an open auction; obviously, prices set in an open auction are not set by 
Google and thus again by definition cannot reflect monopoly power and the 
ability to set prices 
As Greg Burns of the Chicago Tribune reported in his blog after a visit from a team of 
Google spokespeople: 
“ We don' t really think there are serious antitrust concerns,”  said Matthew Bye, 
competition counsel at Google.  “ If you' re doing things that benefit your users, it' s 
hard to find an antitrust problem.”   To hear Bye tell it, those questions all have 
legitimate answers. The idea that airlines and hotels pay too much because of 
anti-competitive practices is a nonstarter, he said. “ We don' t really perceive any 
issue.”  In its keyword auctions, he said, ” We don' t really set prices.”  [16], [17]   
Google chief economist Hal Varian likewise argues that prices for brands are not set 
through monopoly pricing but through auctions, so prices cannot be too high or firms 
would not pay them.  He also argues that companies with strong brands usually aren't 
paying very much for the use of their own brand names as keywords in their ads, 
because their ads are highly relevant to consumers and Google gives them a high 
quality score, allowing them to win even with lower bids.  (The best source for this at 
the time we finished our paper was a YouTube posting, in which Dr. Varian described 
Google’s auctions of search terms.) 
The third point in the list above, that Google does not set prices and therefore by 
definition does not have monopoly power, seems inaccurate in a way that will prove 
critical to the future not only of Google but also to the future of antitrust regulation of 
third party payer mechanisms.  If consumers were to spontaneously make the transition 
to an alternative search engine that ranked search results in the order implied by 
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Google’s internal measure of URL quality, consumers would be no worse off and the 
market price for search terms would be precisely zero.  Setting the price of search terms, 
or of any other essential facility, through competitive auction does not indicate the 
absence of monopoly pricing power.  A lthough all analogies are dangerously imprecise, 
the sole vendor of life jackets on a sinking ocean liner may not strictly set prices 
unilaterally if he auctions them off, but these prices most definitely do reflect monopoly 
power.  Likewise, if there are numerous vendors, each with franchises that give them 
sole rights to sell life jackets on different sinking ships, then their market power is not 
diminished by the number of such vendors that exist throughout the Atlantic.  Again, 
analogies are imprecise, but multiple vendors of essential facilities can enjoy parallel 
monopolies and can be effectively divorced from the discipline of the market. 
Google’s policies do demonstrate sound business and economic analysis.  Google has 
moved from “ rank by bid” , which places the highest bidder on top, to “ rank by 
revenue,”  which places the bidder most profitable for Google on top, usually the 
highest quality bidder, provider that bidder pays “ enough”  for the use of his own 
trademark as a search term (see, for example, Varian [88] for an explanation of rank by 
revenue).  Indeed, rank-by-revenue has been universally adopted, not only by Google 
but also by competitors such as Yahoo and Bing. 
In brief, Google most frequently places the items that they know users truly want atop 
the sponsored search list, ahead of the highest bidders, because this practice generates 
more clicks and more revenue for Google.  That doesn’t mean that the superior seller is 
always placed at the head of the sponsored search list; the superior seller does have to 
bid what Google terms to be enough.  This suggests (1) that in part Google does have 
the power to set prices and (2) Google does know enough to provide an alternative 
recommender system, if indeed it chose to do so in place of a sponsored search 
business. 
Google’s move to rank-by-revenue is beneficial for Google precisely because it is better 
for consumers than rank-by-bid.  Consumers are more likely to find what they want 
than if Google still used rank-by-revenue, and are more likely to be satisfied with the 
URLs on which they click.  This generates adequate consumer satisfaction.  As 
importantly, consistently providing consumers with high-bidding but poor quality 
sponsored search results would signal to consumers that the top spot may be weak and 
that perhaps sponsored search should be ignored entirely.  Since consumers deserting 
sponsored search would destroy Google’s business model, it is not surprising that 
Google has found a way to maximize its revenue, maximize consumer satisfaction, and 
avoid discrediting its own business.   
Google now returns search results largely in the order that you would get from free and 
natural organic search, while still charging companies billions of dollars for the use of 
search terms.  It is hard to ignore the argument that receiving so much revenue, at such 
extraordinary margins, with such limited value added, is not at least suggestive of 
monopoly market power.  This alone does not establish the presence of consumer harm, 
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or indeed of any form of harm.  Where stable business models combined with consumer 
satisfaction and clever revenue maximization ends, and where exploitive monopoly 
pricing begins, is quite beyond the analytical abilities of the present authors, and indeed 
is an issue that is l ikely to confront the courts repeatedly in litigation over digital 
commerce models. 
Possibility of Harm Enabled by Over-Charging in a Non-Contestable M arket 
Relevant market share concentration alone does not demonstrate presence of or abuse 
of monopoly power.  The economist William Baumol and his colleagues have 
developed the concept of contestability, which argues that even in the presence of 
monopoly concentration, the concentration can sometimes be explained by the lack of 
profitability, due perhaps to the lack of barriers to entry, to the presence of effective 
substitutes, or to other factors [11], [12], [13].  Many American cities are currently 
reduced to only a single newspaper, and while this is a source of considerable concern, 
no one is arguing that newspapers are earning monopoly profits (see, e.g., [61], [91]).  
Baumol’s test for the presence or absence of contestability is the firm’s ability to earn 
enough in one market to subsidize others.  This demonstrates the presence of market 
power by demonstrating the presence of monopoly prices, evidenced by the ability to 
generate subsidies, and demonstrates anticompetitive behavior by demonstrating the 
use of these subsidies to deter entry by competitors.v   
It might be argued that since electronic businesses have no barriers to entry, 
contestability cannot be applicable.  We prefer to use contestability as Baumol 
proposed; we look at Google, we see extraordinary margins sufficient to provide 
massive subsidies in unrelated lines of business, and we seek an explanation for the 
absence of contestability these subsidies imply.  Despite spending hundreds of millions 
of dollars on development, and an additional $100 million on advertising, Microsoft has 
not yet been able to provide search that is fully comparable to Google’s.  Microsoft 
readily admits that Bing is not yet fully able to match Google with respect to certain 
categories of search [34].  In a recent blog post by Dave Heiner, Microsoft admitted that 
it is having difficulty catching up to Google because of Google’s superior “long tail” 
search, coupled with other network effects.   
Additionally, we learned in the Microsoft trial that absence of contestability may lead to 
consumer harm.  If a company is earning so much in operating systems that it can 
afford to subsidize web browsers, then the company is both enjoying monopoly power 
in operating systems and overcharging for them, and it is ultimately reducing consumer 
choice in other areas.vi   While subsidized preemptive line extensions may increase 
consumer choice initially, they force other firms out of the market or deter entry, and 
ultimately reduce future consumer options.   
We believe the same arguments will need to be established in any antitrust litigation 
involving Google, and there are several areas that will need to be explored, both in 
understanding Google’s actions and indeed in assessing the actions of any company 
with a similar digital business strategy:  
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• Is Google over-charging consumers or harming consumers in other ways? 
• Are corporations harmed by the market power provided by a third party payer 
system, which frees Google from many marketplace restraints and does, as we 
have seen, allow Google considerable latitude in setting keyword auction prices? 
• Is Google earning enough from sponsored search to subsidize almost all of other 
businesses, including gMail, Google Office, Latitude, gDrive, and others?  If so, 
by Baumol’s contestability argument, it can therefore be presumed to enjoy 
monopoly pricing power in its core search business.  But is Google indeed 
intentionally subsidizing these other businesses, deterring entry and, ultimately, 
allowing them to charge monopoly prices later, either for these offerings or for 
search going forward?  Is the competitive process likely to be harmed? 
Consumer Confusion and the Purchase of Inferior Products and Services  
Confusion matters.  Consumers may be purchasing inferior goods from an inferior 
supplier because the preferred or legitimate supplier was not capable of matching 
fraudulent bids.  Simple comparison of costs will suffice to show that an illegitimate 
attacker will often outbid the legitimate owner of a trademark.  This is not solely a 
hypothetical argument defended with simple computational models, but is also defen-
sible on theoretical terms.  Modeling shows, not surprisingly, that “ the intermediary's 
profit-maximizing design choice, by attributing a positive weight to the firms' bids, 
tends to obfuscate search results and reduce overall consumer surplus compared to the 
socially optimal design of fully transparent results ranked purely on product 
performance.”   In other words, the use of paid search reduces consumer welfare [90].  
And yet it is obvious from inspection that the firm in the top paid search location is not 
always inferior.  Again, by charging the trademark owner just enough and granting the 
trademark owner top the spot in sponsored search, Google maximizes its own revenue 
[39]. 
In its complaint against Google, American airlines argued both that Google was 
creating confusion and that this confusion allowed Google to force American to bid, 
supporting both the argument of confusion and the argument of channel power from 
our discussion of essential facilities and distribution above [35].   
“ In fact, because of the dominant role of Google' s search engine in consumers'  Internet 
usage and habits, Google effectively forces American Airlines to purchase the ' rights'  to 
have the official American Airlines advertisements appear when Internet users search the 
web for the American Airlines Marks.  In other words, Google has set up a system 
wherein American Airlines and others, are, de facto, forced to pay Google to reduce the 
likelihood that consumers will be confused by Google' s own practices.”  
Consumer confusion will continue to be central to litigation against Google.  Consumer 
confusion was the basis of American Airlines complaint against Google, which Google 
settled [35].  Likewise, the concept of consumer confusion and the prospect of consumer 
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mistakes will be central to the retrial of Rescuecom’s litigation ([62] at 130).  In the past 
consumers appeared to have been more confused about the nature of sponsored search 
than they are at present:  Some consumers do not appear to notice that the top lines are 
labeled “ sponsored links” , and some did not appear to understand that these are 
different from organic search results.  We conducted a small real-time polling of 150 
students at the first session of their undergraduate Wharton courses, assessing their 
beliefs about sponsored search.  We found a much higher degree of understanding than 
we saw in previous years.  For example, less than 5% believed that the top line was 
selected to be the best, while the others were roughly split between believing it was 
usually sponsored or usually most popular.  We are not yet sure what the implications 
of this change in awareness might be or to what extent it is shared by the general 
population outside the ranks of students in highly technical business school courses. 
Consumer Confusion and Purchase through Higher Cost Channels   
Consumers may be misdirected to inappropriate or higher cost channels for the goods 
and services that they seek to buy.  Consider the following small hypothetical exercise, 
assuming the following hypothetical market conditions.  Assume that users search for 
“ Marriott Hotels Arlington” , and that Google misdirects 1/ 3 of its searchers to an 
aggregator website such as Arlingtonhotels.com. The aggregator then charges a 15% 
premium on bookings of Marriot rooms.  That is, 15% of the room rate goes not to the 
individual Marriott hotel but to the aggregator as a fee for directing traffic to the hotel; 
this is true even though the traffic actually began by searching for this specific Marriott 
hotel. Because Google has 60% market share of the Internet search market, we would 
calculate that 60%*1/ 3 = 20% of all searches are being misdirected to the aggregator 
rather than directly to Marriott.  Furthermore, since 20% of consumers pay 15% less to 
Marriott than they otherwise would, Marriott’s losses due to Google are = 20% * 15%, or 
3% of room revenues.  An expense like this, l ike a tax or other cost of doing business, is 
passed on to consumers, so that, on average, consumer prices for hotel rooms are 3% 
higher solely due to Google’s allowing a third party to pay for affiliation with 
“ Marriott”  searches and allowing the third party to show up in sponsored searches for 
“ Marriott” . 
The conditions of this hypothetical appear to be very sensitive to the time at which the 
queries are generated.  For whatever reason, abusive search results that we described in 
March of 2009 had vanished by May of 2009, making estimates of consumer harm a 
moving target and difficult to compute. But the website used in this example is not 
hypothetical.  Arlingtonhotels.com actually does exist, and is one of over 50 aggregator 
websites in the family otels.com. 
Collectively, the two sections above suggest the possibility of harm due to abuse of 
trademarks and the misdirection of consumers more generally.  A lthough this is a 
possibility, we have not yet been able to measure it, provide a metric for it, or prove 
significant harm. 
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Corporate Harm, Present and Future:   
The Possibility of Harm Due to Excessive Prices 
The lack of contestability and the presence of prices high enough to sustain cross 
subsidies satisfies Baumol’s conditions for establishing that Google has been charging 
monopoly prices.  Are these higher prices always passed through to consumers, and if 
not, should we care about Google’s charges?  That is, are higher prices to corporations 
grounds for antitrust actions?  It’s clear that consumers do not buy steel or aluminum in 
bulk commodity form, and yet antitrust litigation has been used to protect competition 
(see e.g., [78]).   As noted previously, Google’s third party payer business model allows it 
enormous freedom in the pricing of keywords, and the issue of indirect consumer harm 
due to excessive corporate costs will be an increasingly important consideration in the 
regulation of digital businesses.  Fortunately for the short term prospects of regulation 
of digital businesses, antitrust litigation does not require the demonstration that 
corporate competitors or corporate customers have already been harmed, that 
consumers have already been harmed, or indeed that any current harm has occurred, if 
the prospects for future harm appear sufficiently dangerous.  Of course, however, the 
type of harm that is required for antitrust prosecution is dependent on multiple factors, 
including (i) the plaintiff, (ii) the legal theory for prosecution and (iii) the relief sought.vii 
Injuries in antitrust litigation do not require demonstrating that competitors have been 
harmed; it is sufficient to demonstrate that competition has been harmed.viii   Moreover, 
in Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court stated, “ An act is deemed 
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative efficiency and 
raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality”  ([62] at 
1434).  Thus, if firms are spending more on defending their key words than would be 
optimal and the quality of search is inferior or more expensive than it otherwise would 
be, it should be possible to demonstrate a violation of the Sherman Act. 
Corporate Harm, Present and Future: 
Cross-Subsidies and Denial of Future Entry 
Bundling and tying are the most obvious ways of exploiting cross subsidies.  Bundling 
occurs when a monopoly seller either provides a second product with the purchase of 
the first monopoly offering “ without charge to consumers”  without charge; this is 
considered dangerous because ultimately, having driven out competitors to the second 
offering the monopolist can now charge monopoly prices for the second product as 
well.  Tying occurs when the monopolist producer of a product sells it while requiring 
that the purchaser also pay for a second product, for which the monopolist can now 
charge whatever it wants.  The applicability of bundling and tying would be much 
more clear and much more obvious if Google actually bundled YouTube or Google 
Office with search and with GPS services; this would allow the same logic used to 
attack Microsoft’s bundling of Internet Explorer.  There may already be some form of 
bundling in the interaction among Google mail, search, and advertising.  The 
applicability of bundling and tying may indeed be more clear after examination of the 
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bundling of features into Google’s new phone. 
In American antitrust jurisprudence, the courts have found cross subsidies in certain 
cases to be an antitrust violation.  The most extreme form of this is tying, where the 
purchase of one product is made contingent upon the purchase of a second product.  
However, these need not actually represent separate purchases, merely represent 
transfer of earnings from one market to establish dominance in another.  For example, 
in the case of United States v. Microsoft, the court found that Microsoft’s bundling of its 
operating system and Internet web browser constituted an illegal tying arrangement 
([83] at 51-54); however, this ruling was subsequently reversed on appeal (technically, 
vacated and remanded for further proceedings).  In the end, tying was not proved, 
further complicating analysis ([82] at 50).  In yet another famous case, Image Technical 
Services, Inc., the court found sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement between 
Kodak’s services and its parts ([40] at 464).  The issue of cross-subsidiaries often arises 
in actions alleging monopoly leveraging, in which a firm util izes its dominant market 
position as a lever to create, or to attempt to create, a monopoly in another market.ix   
The courts may see Google’s subsidies for services like YouTube and text-based voice 
mail or their most recent innovation of super-high speed ISP access as damaging to 
other firms that compete in these markets, using subsidized preemptive line extensions to 
deter market entry by other firms [44], [48].  The courts generally view deterring entry 
as ultimately reducing consumer choice, and harming competition.  A lthough readers 
who are not familiar with legal argument may see this as the interjection of personal 
bias from the authors, it is in fact a serious concern of the Department of Justice.  One of 
the problems with cross subsidies as that while they may increase consumer choice 
initially, they tend to reduce consumer choice over the longer term by driving some 
innovators out of the market.  Microsoft may have increased consumer choice with 
Word, Excel, and IE, but where are WordPerfect, 1-2-3, or Netscape today?  The 
antitrust concerns with cross subsidies are based on the belief that subsidies (1) reflect 
monopoly power in the market that generates them and (2) generally reduce consumer 
choice in the market that receives them.   
In fact, a cursory review of Google’s products and services reveals over thirty products 
that are provided free to consumers, and analysts see this as contributing to Google’s 
popularity and profitability [18].  These innovations may be provided as gifts to 
consumers and thus part of Google’s philosophy of “ don’t be evil” , or they may 
represent subsidized preemptive line extensions, ensuring additional monopoly markets 
later.  These are not strictly tied purchases, but cross subsidies and the possibility of 
reduced competition and future monopoly pricing will probably be investigated.x  
In Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Kodak took actions to prevent independent service 
organizations from serving Kodak products ([40]  at 481).  Specifically, Kodak adopted a 
policy of selling parts for its equipment only to customers that serviced their own 
products or used Kodak for their repair services.  After the Supreme Court defined the 
relevant market and determined that Kodak did in fact have monopoly power, the 
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court’s inquiry focused on whether Kodak’s actions were taken to “ foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor”  ([40] at 482-
83).  A lternatively, if Kodak’s actions could be explained by “ valid business reasons,”  
then Kodak could not be held liable ([40] at 483).  Similarly, any analysis of 
monopolization claims against Google will focus on this crucial distinction: whether its 
provision of free services is truly an embodiment of its motto, “ don’t be evil”  or whether 
it is a means of entrenching its position as a distribution company by making its 
products seem freer than free, as indeed the travel agent reservations systems also were 
after override payments from Sabre and Apollo.  
Is Anything in these New Digital Businesses 
Really Subject to Litigation? 
Is Google Really a M onopoly?   
With some estimates of only approximately 60% of the market for online search in the 
United States, Google would not appear to have a monopoly in search.  However, 
Google is actually quite close to the threshold for considering a company to have 
monopoly market share, regardless of the establishment of harm, particularly if 
Google’s estimation of its market share in search engine advertising of 72% is accepted.   
The threshold is usually 70%, with numbers in the range of 40-70% being deemed 
worthy of attention.  As Google’s share continues to grow it may surpass the 70% 
threshold. In HDC Medical, Inc. v. Minntech Corp., the court held that if a defendant that 
has so large a market share as to constitute a predominant share, a rebuttable 
presumption of monopolization applies ([49] at 1103).  Likewise, if Google search is no 
more than another form of advertising, then companies can advertise in The New York 
Times, in Fortune, on television, and of course with Yahoo and Bing.   
The claim that Google is a monopoly, if some claim is made, will be based on some 
combination of the following assertions: 
1. Google is not principally an advertising company, but principally is a 
distribution company, which has chosen to represent itself as an advertising 
company. 
2. In electronic distribution, it is not necessary to be a monopoly to have monopoly 
power.  
3. Google’s pricing of electronic distribution, an essential facility, is anticompetitive. 
4. Google’s actions, especially tying and bundling, demonstrate monopoly pricing 
power. 
What is a M onopoly?   
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the inquiry of whether a defendant can be charged 
with monopolization begins with the threshold question of the relevant market.  After 
the relevant market has been identified, it is necessary to assess whether the defendant 
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possesses “ monopoly power”  within the defined relevant market.  "The offense of 
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" ([80] at 570-71). 
Note that nothing in the definition of monopoly or of monopoly power requires that the 
defendant be the only competitor in its industry, that it charge the highest possible 
prices, or that it charges its own profit maximizing price.  Indeed, monopoly power is 
different from the offense of price fixing, and nothing in the definition of monopoly 
power even requires that the firm with monopoly power explicitly set prices itself. 
Is Action Necessary or Justified?   
However, the mere possession of monopoly power in a relevant market is not a 
violation of Sherman Act §2.  “ The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important 
element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least 
for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct”  ([89] at 407).  Additionally, 
recent Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest a narrow construction of violations 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, noting “ as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust 
duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale”  ([60] at 1119).  
The crux of any claim of monopolization (after defining the relevant market) will focus 
on whether a firm truly engaged in anticompetitive behavior.  Thus, in short, a 
monopolist will be found to violate §2 of the Sherman Act if it engages in exclusionary 
or predatory conduct without a valid business justification ([55] at 157).  In more 
complex cases in which the allegedly monopolizing acts are not independently illegal, 
the courts have engaged in a more thorough review of whether the defendant has 
acquired or enhanced its monopoly power through means that are competitively 
unreasonable.xi 
Is New Legal Doctrine Required to Permit Action?   
The regulatory regime of the Sherman Act was soon extended with concepts of a 
natural monopoly and of a regulated natural monopoly, as embodied in the Kingsbury 
Commitment. These were needed in order to deal with the market power of AT&T, due 
to the combination of (1) the clear benefits of interconnectivity, leading to massive 
positive network participation externalities, (2) the technical difficulties of 
interconnectivity of separate competing networks with existing hardware available at 
the time, and (3) the enormous costs associated with the construction of redundant 
networks.  Consumer welfare and technology interacted in a way that demanded that 
AT&T be a monopoly, and that likewise demanded regulation of that monopoly. 
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Perhaps the tersest explanation of the Kingsbury Commitment’s role in the emergence 
of AT&T as a regulated monopoly can still be found on AT&T’s website: “ For much of 
its history, AT&T and its Bell System functioned as a legally sanctioned, regulated 
monopoly. The fundamental principle, formulated by AT&T president Theodore Vail in 
1907, was that the telephone by the nature of its technology would operate most 
efficiently as a monopoly providing universal service. Vail wrote in that year's AT&T 
Annual Report that government regulation, “ provided it is independent, intelligent, 
considerate, thorough and just,”  was an appropriate and acceptable substitute for the 
competitive marketplace.  The United States government accepted this principle, 
initially in a 1913 agreement known as the Kingsbury Commitment.  
It may be necessary once again to extend the regulatory regime of antitrust in order to 
deal with the market power obtained by Google, if it is felt that Google’s power poses a 
sufficient threat and that both competition and welfare demand regulation.  If Google 
does have power, this power does not arise, as some have said, because search is a 
natural monopoly [53], but rather because (1) search is an essential facility, needed both 
by consumers and by firms that offer goods and services to them, and (2) search engine 
companies’ third party payer model effectively decouples the pricing of key words and 
of participation as the object of search from the regulation of the market, giving giant 
search companies such as Google effective monopoly power even in the absence of a 
formal monopoly, and (3) Google is demonstrably charging monopoly prices for 
keywords, as evidenced inter alia by cross subsidies and the contestability test of 
Baumol, and (4) as discussed above Google’s use of these cross subsidies may be seen as 
subsidized preemptive line extensions, and they may at present or in the future harm 
competition.  
Conclusions and Directions for Further Work 
Conclusions Regarding Five Issues Studied 
The first area we addressed was determining when you have a monopoly.  The study of 
Google, like the prior antitrust case against Microsoft, underscores the importance of 
defining the relevant market before assessing market share.  Any antitrust case against 
Google will begin by addressing whether paid search is a form of advertising or a form 
of distribution.  While we believe that search is different from advertising, this will be 
hotly contested in any antitrust litigation concerning Google, and is likely to be hotly 
contested in future litigation, until case law effectively establishes when a new digital 
business model represents a new product or service. 
The second area was determining when a firm has monopoly power and monopoly 
ability to set prices.  We believe we have established that search is a form of distribution 
and that distribution is an essential facility with enormous power, and that this power 
comes even without monopoly share as traditionally defined.  Likewise, we believe that 
we have established that monopoly pricing power is distinct from actually setting 
prices; that said, this may be seen as contingent on relevant market, and thus remains 
subject to interpretation by the courts.  Contestability theory and the ability to price in 
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one market at levels high enough to subsidize numerous unrelated markets has been 
seen in other instances as evidence of monopoly pricing power, and supports our 
conclusions. 
The third area was how to determine whether consumers, corporations, and the 
competitive process has been harmed, focusing on Google.  We have not established 
either measures for this or the presence of harm, and it remains a direction for future 
research, by academics, by companies that feel harmed, and by the courts. 
We ask if monopoly abuses by digital businesses can be addressed by current 
regulatory practices, and conclude that this may be quite difficult.  For example, we 
cannot determine if Google obtained its power legally or not, and under current legal 
doctrine intent to monopolize and monopoly power obtained illegally are essential for 
prosecution.  If Google is found to have monopoly power, and found to have caused 
harm, and can be shown to have obtained power legally without intent to monopolize, 
then we may have an instance in which current legal remedies are clearly inadequate.    
Finally, we asked if additional regulation might be needed, if for example search were 
found to be an essential facility and if the essential facilities doctrine were found to hold 
only when the owner of the facility and the harmed party were direct competitors in the 
same industry.  More generally, as explored next, third party payer business models 
combined with electronic distribution may create a need for new regulation. 
Is Additional Regulation Actually Needed?   
If there is harm it would appear that some action will be required to stop it, for three 
reasons that were explored above: 
1. Google’s pricing is decoupled from market discipline because the user and the 
payer are not the same, and hence high prices charged do not alter user behavior   
Thus, third party payer monopolies may be stable.  Again, in the specific instance 
of Google, even if Google were found to be an expensive monopolist, no one is in 
a position to offer search that consumers believe is cheaper.  This is because it 
search could not be cheaper for consumers:  Consumers think it is already 
cheaper than free, since it costs them nothing, and they are provided with a wide 
range free ancillary services.   
2. And, if search is found to be an essential facil ity and if use of Google is the stable 
search engine decision of most consumers, then this is the search engine where 
corporations have to appear.  Bidders will continue to bid, and if there is harm, 
then harm will continue to occur.   
3. Moreover, since keyword auctions and sponsored search provide Google with 
the revenue stream it currently enjoys, then the ability to misdirect consumers 
and the ability to stifle competition in a range of markets that Google subsidizes 
both will remain. 
Again, we use Google merely as the most recent and currently most successful of a third 
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party payer distribution system.  As explored above, it is not clear if or how litigation 
will proceed in the case of Google, whether harm has occurred, or whether additional 
legislative or regulatory guidance is required in this instance.  More generally, we do 
feel that third party payer distribution systems are a fundamental departure from the 
sorts of issues faced when the Sherman Act was drafted or litigated in the past, and 
indeed that new digital business models will require new regulatory regimes. 
Directions for Future Research  
If additional regulation of Google is required it is not clear that current antitrust 
jurisprudence is prepared to address the regulation of third party payer digital 
businesses, any more than the Sherman Act was able to address natural monopolies.  
This did not mean that the Sherman Act needed to be scrapped, or even formally 
amended.  Rather, when society wanted the benefits of inter-operability that a 
monopoly telecommunications provider offered in the early 1900s, and also wanted 
protection from the potential abuses of a monopoly, a solution outside the remedies of 
the Sherman Act was required.  The result was the Kingsbury Commitment, which led 
to the first sanctioned, state-regulated, corporate monopoly.  Society may want both 
winner take all businesses and the illusion of cost-free service that comes from third 
party payer business models; it may also need to be protected from the potential abuses 
of monopoly that this may create.  There is a clear need for future research at the 
intersection of business strategy, regulatory economics, information economics, and the 
law. 
We have addressed the possible need for regulation if harm has been demonstrated.  
But is there really consumer harm or harm to competition?  This needs to be more 
carefully assessed.  We believe that we have shown the possibility of harm due to 
consumer confusion, the possibility of harm due to stifling of competition, and the 
possibility of abusive monopoly pricing of an essential facility.  We have not yet 
established that such harm exists, let alone provided a metric for it or a measure of it.  
Future research is necessary to address both deficiencies in the current work.  
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format adopted in the legal profession.  The citation includes information about the reporter as well as the court and 
the date.   
With the recent Rescuecom decision it has recently suffered one of its first significant legal setbacks [52].  Rescue-
com has sued Google for use of its trademark in sponsored search, and the appellate court has reversed the district 
court decision and found for Rescuecom.  Trademarks are protected from “use in commerce” by other than the 
mark’s owner.  The appellate court held that Google’s use of trademarks met the requisite standard for “use in 
commerce” because: (1) Google is recommending and selling to its advertisers Rescuecom’s trademark; and (2) 
Google encourages the purchase of Rescuecom’s mark through its Keyword Suggestion Tool. ([63] at 129).  The 
Rescuecom case is interesting and complex, and in some sense remains unresolved.  Trademark protection forbids 
the use of another firm’s trademark “in commerce” in a manner likely to cause confusion, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation of goods services, although fair use does permit the use of another firm’s trademark in other contexts.  
Google’s selling of a trademark to a competitor of the trademark owner is indeed commercial use, but it may not 
constitute “commercial use” in the sense originally intended by the Lanham Act. (See e.g., [63]at 130-31). 
ii In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit articulated a general definition and test of monopolizing conduct: “To be condemned 
as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’  That is, it must harm the competitive 
process and thereby harm consumers.  In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not suffice... In considering 
whether the monopolist’s conduct on balance harms competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for 
purposes of §2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it.  Evidence of the intent 
behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the 
monopolist’s conduct ([81] at 58-59). 
iii Specifically, courts limit cases in which plaintiffs have antitrust standing to cases that do not “avoid burdening the 
courts with speculative or remote claims ([8] at 545; see also [74] at 1448 ("Antitrust standing is best understood in 
a general sense as a search for the proper plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws.")); [4].  Courts, as a threshold 
concern, require that the plaintiff be able to show “antitrust injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent.”  [9] at 334; [19] at 109-10; [15] at 489. 
iv  The concept of relevant markets has been integral in analyzing monopoly power as direct proof of such power is 
rarely available.  Under this approach, courts infer monopoly power from a firm’s possession of a dominant share of 
a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers ([81] at  51  (citing [62] at 1434)).  The principal Supreme Court 
case outlining the requirements for defining the relevant product defined the relevant market as that which includes 
all products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes ([79] at  395). 
v More stringent tests are possible.  Based on the Supreme Court’s view of the “vice” of tying in Times-Picayune 
Publishing Co. v. United States [85] as “the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the 
merits in another,” courts have held that a firm may not utilize its dominant market position as a lever to create, or 
attempt to create, a monopoly in another market.  However, courts are divided as to what is sufficient 
anticompetitive conduct in the leveraged market to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.   
vi [83] (stating “[d]espite the fact that it did not charge for Internet Explorer, Microsoft could still defray the massive 
costs it was undertaking to maximize usage share with the vast profits earned licensing Windows. Because Netscape 
did not have that luxury, it could ill afford the dramatic drop in revenues from Navigator, much less to pay for the 
inefficient modes of distribution to which Microsoft had consigned it. The financial constraints also deterred 
Netscape from undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have implemented in Navigator.”) 
vii The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend to afford a remedy to everyone injured by an antitrust 
violation simply on a showing of causation ([8] at 535).  Specifically, the 9th Circuit summarized the factors in 
establishing antitrust standing as follows: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury; that is, whether it was the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the speculative measure of the 
harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in apportioning damages” ([51] at 987, citing [3] 
at 1054-55). 
viii   See, e.g., ([20] at 571).  In Fisherman v. Estate of Wirtz, the court stated, “The antitrust laws are concerned with 
the competitive process, and their application does not depend in each particular case upon the ultimate 
demonstrable consumer effect. A healthy and unimpaired competitive process is presumed to be in the consumer 
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith Natural Draft 8.11 / /  29 June 2010 
Monopolies or Third Party Payment Business Models page 42                                                                                                                                                                                   
interest” ([42] at 536).  In United States v. Microsoft, the court similarly defined anticompetitive conduct as that 
which harms the competitive process and thereby harms consumers ([81] at 58). 
ix In AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, AD/SAT, who engaged in delivering electronically 
transmitted advertisements to newspapers, accused the Associated Press of attempted monopolization, 
monopolization, and monopoly leveraging among other claims ([2] at  220-21).  However, the Associated Press 
prevailed against claims of monopoly leveraging because AD/SAT failed to demonstrate that the service was 
subsidized by AP’s other activities ([2] at 231-32). 
x This is not to suggest that below cost pricing is itself i llegal.  In order for this to be actionable, American 
antitrust jurisprudence requires a l ikelihood that the below cost pricing will ultimate result in prices 
above the competitive level and these prices would be sufficient to recoup the losses from below cost 
pricing.  (See [14], holding that a charge of predatory pricing under the Sherman Act requires pricing 
“ below an appropriate measure of [the defendant’s] costs and that the market forces are such that there is 
a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost pricing.)  
Although giving away products or services without charge is not illegal, it can be evidence of anticompetitive 
behavior when it is coupled with “a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve” and “distinctly 
anticompetitive bent.”x   This is, of course, a very fact-intensive inquiry and one in which the distinctions between 
competitive and anticompetitive behavior are not so clear.  In fact, the Supreme Court struggled with this very 
question in its most recent antitrust cases (See e.g., [40]; [88]; [60]). 
xi In more complex cases in which the allegedly monopolizing acts are not independently illegal, the courts have 
engaged in a more thorough review of whether the defendant has acquired or enhanced its monopoly power through 
means that are competitively unreasonable (See e.g., [7]) (employing a balancing test that asked whether the 
challenged conduct had “impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way” by attempting to “exclude rivals 
on some basis other than efficiency” and whether the conduct’s “effect . . . on consumers, on [the defendant’s] 
smaller rival, and on [the defendant] itself.”); [40] (asking “whether ‘valid business reasons’ … explain [the 
defendant’s] actions”); ([88] at 399) (reviewing the defendant’s actions to see if it had engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct manifesting “a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end” and “a distinctly 
anticompetitive bent.”).   
